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Net	Neutrality	in	a	hyperlinked	Internet	economy
Have	you	ever	realized	that	the	websites	and	social	platforms	you	use	are	full	of	links	that	lead	you	to	contents,
videos	or	advertisements	of	other	content	providers?	And	that	you	usually	surf	from	one	site	to	another	without	typing
their	URL	addresses?	No	doubt,	this	is	an	important	feature	of	the	Internet.	For	instance,	direct	visits	of	The	New
York	Times	represent	only	44	per	cent	of	its	total	traffic,	whereas	the	rest	of	traffic	is	originated	through	social
platforms	and	search	engines.	Content	Providers	(CPs)	like	receiving	this	type	of	indirect	visitors	because	they	obtain
additional	advertisement	revenues.	A	stimulating	question	is	why	CPs	want	to	place	links	to	their	rivals?	For	instance,
why	do	social	platforms	promote	users’	profiles	on	other	social	networks?
In	order	to	answer	these	questions,	we	have	created	a	simple	economic	model	in	which	two	CPs	compete	for
visitors,	but	they	can	also	link	each	other	to	enhance	their	contents.	The	links	give	Internet	users	the	opportunity	to
visit	both	websites	and	to	obtain	more	utility;	otherwise,	they	only	visit	one	website.	CPs	obtain	money	by	embedding
advertisements	into	their	contents.	Another	important	element	of	our	model	is	that	CPs	have	to	gain	access	to	the
network	of	an	Internet	Service	Provider	(ISP)	in	order	to	reach	their	visitors.	Under	the	Net	Neutrality	(NN)	regime,
this	access	comes	for	free.	Without	the	NN	regulation,	CPs	have	to	pay	the	ISP	a	termination	fee	for	using	its
network.
Net	Neutrality	has	been	a	globally	accepted	regulation	of	the	Internet	service	that	requires	the	equal	treatment	of	all
data	sent	and	received	without	differential	charges	and	service	quality.	This	regulation	responds	to	the	idea	that	NN
spurs	competition	among	ISPs	for	product	quality,	which	promotes	consumer	well-being	and	social	welfare.	Net
Neutrality	is	in	force	in	the	EU	according	to	the	Regulation	2015/2120	in	support	of	a	Digital	Single	Market.	However,
this	view	of	the	Internet	market	has	recently	started	to	change.	On	December	14,	2017,	the	US	Federal
Communications	Commission	(FCC)	effectively	reneged	on	its	own	2015	Open	Internet	Order,	which	was	devised	to
allow	open	and	fair	access	to	the	Internet.	As	the	opponents	of	this	decision	have	pointed	out,	ISPs	now	have	the
power	to	block	websites,	throttle	services	and	censor	online	content.
Does	it	mean	that,	in	the	US,	large	ISPs	are	allowed	to	negotiate	the	terms	of	access	to	their	networks	with	CPs,
affecting	the	variety	and	the	quality	of	the	contents	that	can	be	accessed	by	Internet	users?	For	the	time	being,	the
courts	are	still	deliberating	the	FCC’s	decision,	but	some	ISPs	have	already	planned	to	introduce	several
discriminatory	practices.	For	example,	there	are	ISPs	that	intend	to	employ	a	bundling	system,	through	which
consumers	wanting	to	access	certain	CPs	(e.g.	Facebook	and	Twitter)	have	to	pay	a	premium	social	media	package.
Another	practice	that	ISPs	can	adopt	immediately	is	to	exclude	their	own	content	from	counting	against	their
subscribers’	data	plan,	thus	modifying	the	consumers’	choice.
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In	this	situation,	you	may	wonder	if	there	is	any	benefit	for	consumers	and	society	to	remove	the	NN	rule.	The
answer	of	this	question	lies	on	the	usual	trade-off	between	static	and	dynamic	efficiency.	The	FCC	envisions	that	the
shift	from	pre-emptive	regulation	to	targeted	enforcement	based	on	actual	market	failure	or	anti-competitive	conduct
will	boost	ISPs’	investments	in	Next	Generations	Access	(NGA)	networks.	Such	investments	have	been	proven	to
promote	productivity,	employment	and	economic	growth.
Now,	let’s	go	back	to	our	article,	which	considers	the	possibility	that	ISPs	can	charge	a	termination	fee	to	CPs	to
deliver	their	Internet	traffic.	First,	we	show	that	rival	CPs	have	an	incentive	to	reach	a	linking	agreement	that
complements	their	contents	when	the	termination	fee	set	by	the	ISP	is	not	too	high,	which	is	precisely	what	happens
under	the	NN	rule.	The	links	to	the	rival’s	contents	increase	the	quality	of	the	service	offered	by	each	CP,	and
generate	indirect	traffic	to	them.	Second,	we	explain	that	in	the	absence	of	the	NN	rule,	the	ISP	may	still	be
interested	in	setting	a	low	termination	fee	to	incentivize	CPs	to	reach	a	linking	agreement.	The	links	generate	more
traffic,	which	translates	into	more	termination	revenues	for	the	ISP.	In	addition,	the	increase	in	the	quality	of	the
contents	generated	by	the	links	allows	the	ISP	to	set	a	higher	subscription	fee	to	the	end	users.	It	is	only	when	the
cost	of	increasing	the	network	capacity	is	very	high	that	the	ISP	would	decide	to	increase	the	termination	fee	so	as	to
disincentivize	the	use	of	links.
Taking	this	into	account,	we	argue	that	when	the	ISP’s	transmission	cost	is	sufficiently	low	and	it	sets	a	low
termination	fee,	the	imposition	of	NN	is	a	sufficient,	but	not	a	necessary,	condition	to	maximize	social	welfare.
Indeed,	social	welfare	could	be	maximized	with	the	imposition	of	a	positive	price	ceiling	for	the	termination	fee.	When
the	transmission	cost	takes	higher	values,	however,	the	welfare-maximizing	and	the	profit-maximizing	termination
fees	may	not	be	aligned,	and	the	regulation	of	the	termination	fee	may	be	necessary.	In	this	situation,	the	NN	rule	is
less	likely	to	be	justifiable	since	it	proves	to	be	detrimental	in	most	cases.
To	sum	up,	Net	Neutrality	has	been	an	essential	regulation	for	the	Internet	and	its	relaxation	can	have	important
consequences	which	have	not	been	fully	examined	yet.	Our	work	has	tried	to	contribute	to	the	debate	about	this	rule
by	analysing	its	effects	on	the	linking	activity	of	Content	Providers.	We	have	shown	that	the	NN	rule	favours	the	use
of	links	by	CPs,	although	in	some	cases	this	regulation	may	lead	to	excessive	indirect	Internet	traffic	from	a	social
perspective.
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